Supreme Court Again Imposes Its Own Policy Views On Nation By Overturning 37 States And DC That Allowed Juvenile Imprisonment For Life Without Parole

The Los Angeles Times reports that the "Supreme Court for the first time on Monday put a strict constitutional limit on prison terms, ruling it is cruel and unusual punishment to send a young criminal to prison for life with no chance for parole for a crime that does not involve murder. The ruling is the second in recent years to greatly expand the constitutional protections for juveniles. And once again, the justices in the majority said they agreed with international critics who say the United States is out of step when it comes to treatment for the young. There has been a 'global consensus' among all nations but the United States that juvenile criminals should not be locked up for life with no chance to rehabilitate themselves, said Justice Anthony M. Kennedy."

This is another inexcusable ruling from the Supreme Court that makes a mockery of the Constitution. What other countries and nations may or may not think of American practices and laws has absolutely no bearing on the Constitutionality of the law in question. Those who adopted our Constitution could never have imagined that a "global consensus" would have any influence on what the Constitution means. The Supreme Court has done nothing more than impose its own policy preference on the nation, and by fiat overrule the legitimate and democratic will of a strong majority of the States and the District of Columbia. They have completely ignored the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, as they do much of the Constitution. The Supreme Court continues to allow our Constitution to "evolve" in a direction that a majority of current Supreme Court Justices would simply prefer, but that was never intended. The ruling has no basis in the Constitution whatsoever. There is no clearer example of judicial usurpation of policymaking, the legitimate role of an elected legislature, than this decision. The Constitution is once again being shredded by a Supreme Court that views itself as a standing committee that based on little more than a policy preference believes it can overturn clearly Constitutional legislation.

Justice Clarence Thomas eviscerated this unconstitutional ruling, in the sense that it refuses to faithfully apply the Constitution and instead imposes a policy view on the country in spite of the Constitution, in his dissent. Thomas writes that "[a]lthough the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this sentencing practice, and although it would not have offended the standards that prevailed at the founding, the Court insists that the standards of American society have evolved such that the Constitution now requires its prohibition. The news of this evolution will, I think, come as a surprise to the American people. Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States allow judges and juries to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile nonhomicide cases, and those judges and juries have decided to use it in the very worst cases they have encountered. The Court does not conclude that life without parole itself is a cruel and unusual punishment. It instead rejects the judgments of those legislatures, judges, and juries regarding what the Court describes as the 'moral' question of whether this sentence can ever be 'proportionat[e]' when applied to the category of offenders at issue here... I am unwilling to assume that we, as members of this Court, are any more capable of making such moral judgments than our fellow citizens. Nothing in our training as judges qualifies us for that task, and nothing in Article III gives us that authority."

Thomas continues by pointing out that recently "the Court has held that the [Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments] Clause authorizes it to proscribe not only methods of punishment that qualify as 'cruel and unusual,' but also any punishment that the Court deems 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime committed," an interpretation that "is entirely the Court’s creation." There is "no indication that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause originally was understood to require proportionality in sentencing" and "it suffices to recall just two points. First, the Clause does not expressly refer to proportionality or invoke any synonym for that term, even though the Framers were familiar with the concept, as evidenced by several founding-era state constitutions that required (albeit without defining) proportional punishments." Furthermore, "the penal statute adopted by the First Congress demonstrates that proportionality in sentencing was not considered a constitutional command." As Thomas plainly points out, "[t]he categorical proportionality review the Court employs in capital cases thus lacks a principled foundation. The Court’s decision today is significant because it does not merely apply this standard—it remarkably expands its reach. For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone." Thomas continues by explaining that "[u]ntil today, the Court has based its categorical proportionality rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special protection to capital defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment," but that "[t]oday’s decision eviscerates that distinction. 'Death is different' no longer."

Further, Thomas writes that even if one accepts the Court's doctrine that a "national consensus" against a punishment renders it "cruel and unusual" and therefore unconstitutional (a notion which itself also has little basis in the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment), it is clear that "[n]o plausible claim of a consensus against this sentencing practice can be made in light of this overwhelming legislative evidence. The sole fact that federal law authorizes this practice singlehandedly refutes the claim that our Nation finds it morally repugnant. The additional reality that 37 out of 50 States (a supermajority of 74%) permit the practice makes the claim utterly implausible. Not only is there no consensus against this penalty, there is a clear legislative consensus in favor of its availability."

Justice Thomas concludes: "The ultimate question in this case is not whether a life-without-parole sentence ‘fits’ the crime at issue here or the crimes of juvenile nonhomicide offenders more generally, but to whom the Constitution assigns that decision. The Florida Legislature has concluded that such sentences should be available for persons under 18 who commit certain crimes, and the trial judge in this case decided to impose that legislatively authorized sentence here. Because a life-without-parole prison sentence is not a 'cruel and unusual' method of punishment under any standard, the Eighth Amendment gives this Court no authority to reject those judgments. It would be unjustifiable for the Court to declare otherwise even if it could claim that a bare majority of state laws supported its independent moral view. The fact that the Court categorically prohibits life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders in the face of an overwhelming legislative majority in favor of leaving that sentencing option available under certain cases simply illustrates how far beyond any cognizable constitutional principle the Court has reached to ensure that its own sense of morality and retributive justice pre-empts that of the people and their representatives. I agree with Justice Stevens that '[w]e learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.'(concurring opinion). Perhaps one day the Court will learn from this one. I respectfully dissent." Tweet